When Hurricane Katrina flooded the city of New Orleans, among the many concerns left in its wake was that of the contaminants that were released or exposed.
The presence of these potential sources of toxics, pathogens and other contaminants led to immediate concerns for acute exposure to aid workers, stranded flood victims, and immediately after flooding, to returning residents. In addition, however, lingering questions remain about chronic exposure to these contaminants and the longterm effects of such exposure. It is toward an evaluation of both the acute and chronic exposures that this summary is directed. Several monitoring efforts were undertaken during and subsequent to the flooding to quantitatively evaluate the extent of chemical and biological contamination and assess the exposure and risk to these toxics and contaminants. Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), collected environmental samples both within New
Orleans and throughout the surrounding area impacted by Hurricane Katrina. Initial concerns within the city were focused on acute exposure concerns for stranded residents and relief workers. Subsequent efforts have focused on acute exposure concerns for returning residents and the initial assessments of chronic exposures. Additional independent sampling has also been conducted, including that reported by Pardue et al. (2005) , Presley et al. (2006) and those reported by the National Resources Defense Council 6 . The concentration of chemical and biological constituents reported by the various studies to-date have generally painted a consistent picture of contamination in the air, water and soils and sediments of New Orleans both during and after the flood.
Together these studies provide a reasonable characterization of the general quality of the floodwaters and the soils and sediments that remain after the floodwater receded. They represent a relatively sparse data set, however, and therefore may not fully characterize localized problems. Typically, regulatory agencies assess risk on the basis of 95% upper confidence limits in concentrations of media to which exposure occurs, but for simplicity and because of the difficulty in characterizing the statistics of sparse data sets, we will generally focus on maximum observed concentrations. Our goal here is to summarize key results from the available data in order to assess the general character of the toxics and contaminant exposure faced during and after the flooding and to provide a perspective on the significance of those findings as we move forward in the rebuilding of New Orleans.
Exposures during flooding
Floodwaters were present in the city from the passage of the storm on August 29, 2005 until the city was declared dewatered by the US Army Corps of Engineers on October 11. Sampling of these floodwaters showed elevated levels of a variety of inorganic and organic contaminants and biological constituents including pathogens.
6 http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/katrinadata/contents.asp Inorganic contaminants in floodwaters were generally low, even when compared to drinking water standards. Presley et al. (2006) observed no floodwater samples that exhibited concentrations in excess of drinking water or acute and chronic threshold concentrations. Pardue et al. (2005) noted consistent exceedances of drinking water standards for arsenic in the floodwaters (mean of 30 μg/L compared to a maximum contaminant level in drinking water of 10 μg/L). Drinking water standards, however, are, in general, an inappropriate indicator of water quality for floodwaters because they are based on the assumption that the public is drinking two liters of the water every day of the year for 70 years and the actual ingestion and dermal exposure to flood waters is much less than to drinking water. Organic constituents were also detected in floodwaters at relatively low concentrations. This observation was initially met with some surprise since oil and hydrocarbon fuel spills were evident in many locations. More soluble petroleum oils and fuels constituents, such as benzene, however, are typically also volatile leading to rapid release to the air. Less soluble constituents would partition to sediments left behind by the floodwaters. EPA concluded that inorganic and organic chemical concentrations in floodwater were generally below levels of concern for short term (90 days) dermal contact and incidental ingestion 7 .
Bacterial contamination in the floodwaters was a source of greater concern.
Median concentrations of fecal coliform of approximately 10 4 MPN/100 mL were detected in the floodwaters (Pardue et al., 2005) . This can be compared to a water quality standard for primary contact of 200 MPN/100 mL. Potentially of greater concern was the detection of human pathogens, such as the detection of Aeromonas spp. at 7 http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/katrina_env_assessment_summary.htm concentrations of the order of 10 7 CFU/mL at two locations in the downtown area (Presley et al., 2006) . Members of the genus Aeromonas have been associated with diarrhea and wound infections in humans (Janda and Duffey, 1988) , however they are also frequently isolated from soils and freshwaters.
In addition to concerns about exposures of stranded residents and relief workers to the floodwaters, the immediate and long-term impact of discharge of the floodwaters to Lake Pontchartrain was also of concern. Between September 6 and October 11, these floodwaters were discharged to Lake Pontchartrain, to the north of the city and the source of much of the floodwaters. Lake Pontchartrain is a brackish, shallow lake with a surface area of approximately 1630 km 2 and an average depth of about 4 m and contains an active commercial fishery. Low levels of dissolved oxygen were detected in floodwaters and in discharged water by Pardue et al. (2005) . This likely resulted in low oxygen levels in the immediate vicinity of the discharge point but minimal impact on the lake as a whole. Similarly the generally low levels of inorganic and organic contaminants in the floodwaters were unlikely to lead to significant impacts on Lake Pontchartrain. The sediments at the mouth of the discharge canals already contained levels of some contaminants prior to the flooding due to normal wastewater and stormwater discharges from the city. The Katrina floodwaters were characterized as similar in character, although significantly larger in volume, to the normal storm waters discharged into the lake 8 . Bacterial contamination of the discharge waters was typically an order of magnitude higher than values found in the lake prior to discharge (as measured by fecal coliform concentration, Pardue et al., 2005) but EPA collected more than 100 samples in recreational limits 9 .
In summary, direct exposure to floodwaters either within the city or in Lake
Pontchartrain appeared likely to result in minimal toxic and contaminant impacts with the possible exception of biological pathogens.
Exposures to soil and sediment post-flooding
Although floodwaters were removed from the city by October 11, 2005, their legacy of contaminated soils, sediments, debris and houses remains. In addition to the existing soils and debris, sediment mobilized from storm surge through Lake
Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet/Industrial Canal was deposited in the city Additional sampling has been conducted to assess the concentrations of chemical and biological contaminants in these media and to evaluate the impacts thereof. Presley et al. Health Screening Levels are used for evaluate the "relative environmental concern for a site or set of environmental data. The values are not regulatory, but are derived using equations from EPA guidance and commonly used defaults."
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The Screening Levels are "not generated to represent action levels or cleanup levels but rather as a technical tool." 11 Screening Levels are "chemical concentrations that Samples were also collected at several specific sites where known or potential leaks of hazardous materials might be found. Elevated concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons and a variety of crude oil associated contaminants were observed in the vicinity of the Murphy Oil crude oil tank failure and spill. Because the latter contamination had a clearly identifiable source and is easily differentiated from the general flooding related contamination, this area is being managed separately from the rest of the flooded area and will not be considered further here. EPA also collected 74 soil samples at the site of the Agriculture Street Landfill, a closed Superfund site that was flooded by Katrina. All samples were analyzed for lead, which was the contaminant of concern that defined the cleanup. The samples were collected immediately above the geotextile liner (12-24" below ground surface) which was installed as part of the site remedy. No samples exhibited concentrations that exceeded the lead cleanup standard or EPA screening standards for lead, and EPA concluded that the flooding did not impact the effectiveness of the remedy 15 . The NRDC analyzed for other contaminants at this site and found arsenic at levels similar to other New Orleans sites and a variety of high molecular weight PAHs at somewhat elevated levels 16 . They ascribed the presence of the high molecular weight PAHs to leachate from the landfill although the hydrophobic nature of these compounds would be such that they would more likely be transported by resuspended soil from the site or elsewhere. Further assessment of this area might be warranted.
The conclusion from this sampling is that there was no general contamination of New Orleans to clearly unacceptable levels -especially with respect to acute exposures.
There appear to be some areas where concentrations exceed applicable screening values and some specific areas impacted by particular events, such as the failure of the crude oil storage tank in St. Bernard Parish.
Complicating the assessment of these concentrations in soils and sediments is the presence of a pre-Katrina background of contamination. For example, the background of arsenic is of the order of 10 mg/kg throughout the Mississippi River Delta region of south Louisiana (Gustavsson et al., 2001) and LDEQ has reported a background arsenic concentration of 7 mg/kg. Pre-Katrina concentrations of arsenic could be higher in residential areas due to the presence of arsenic in a variety of lawn fertilizers. 17 Lead has also long been a concern in inner city New Orleans with H. Mielke reporting that 40% of nearly 5000 soil samples showed lead levels in excess of 400 mg/kg (Pelley, 2006 ). 
Current Risks
Regardless of whether current levels of contamination were present pre-Katrina or due to the destructive effects of the storm, the question before residents attempting to return to the city is the level of risk and need for remediation prior to return.
Complicating the assessment of the need for remedial activities is the uniqueness of the short-term exposure pathways for residents returning to New Orleans. Homeowners returning to flooded homes have been faced with removal of both wet and dry sediment from the home and yard. Generation and exposure to airborne dusts from these sediments has also occurred and is exacerbated by demolition or home "gutting" activities occurring across the region. Thus the need for remedial activities at any particular site in New Orleans as a result of residual contamination post-Katrina must be assessed on the basis of an evaluation of that site for 1) average concentrations within an area in which a resident or work might be regularly exposed exceeding screening values and 2) pathways and attenuation along routes of exposure that lead to unacceptable risk.
It should be noted that even screening values based upon generally conservative default assumptions may not be fully protective in all cases. More generally, EPA, states, and the general scientific community are regularly re-assessing whether the methodologies utilized in the risk assessment process are adequate to protect children or other sensitive populations, even when default exposure values are utilized. Currently, this question is supposed to be addressed on a case-by-case assessment.
The difficulty with a site-specific assessment and evaluation approach is the cost of sampling and analysis. On the other hand, use of screening levels as remedial goals could add significant cost to any remedial efforts undertaken without assurance that there would be commensurate significant reduction in risk, thereby diverting limited resources to address minor risks. Individual homeowners could assess the contamination concerns on their own property but in the absence of government support for both the testing and the cleanup, the impact would fall disproportionately on the poor. The response would naturally be avoidance of testing. Any generic response to potential contamination concerns, however, would undoubtedly lead to destruction of property that did not pose excessive risks and further slow the return of people to their homes and the rebuilding of their lives.
A further concern for returning residents is the presence of mold and airborne mold spores in homes. Unlike air, water and soil contamination, there exists little scientific basis to evaluate the potential effects of mold on human health, and in particular to develop risk based action or cleanup levels. Mold counts of 50,000 spores/m 3 are considered very high and yet spore counts of up to 650,000 spores/m 3 were observed by NRDC in a home in mid-city New Orleans 21 . No standards exist to which these mold counts can be compared and there is no clear regulatory responsibility for indoor air among federal agencies. The high mold counts are causes for concern and both NRDC and EPA recommend caution among returning residents, use of respiratory protection, and complete cleanup of flooded homes including removal of all porous construction materials including carpets and drywall.
Outlook
The flooding of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina resulted in the potential for exposure to toxics and contaminants that was unparalleled by other natural disasters. Initial concerns about the generation of a "toxic gumbo", however, have not been supported by the sampling and analyses conducted to-date. Floodwaters did contain significant short-term biological hazards that posed risks to stranded residents and relief workers. These floodwaters did not contain chemical toxicants at levels that are expected to lead to long-term impacts on the surroundings beyond that which would be expected of a similar volume of stormwaters from the city. The floodwaters undoubtedly redistributed some contaminants in the city, but the contaminant burden in the soils and Unfortunately, the currently available data do not identify a sufficiently serious contamination problem to drive government and public action toward answering these questions. In the absence of a clear driver for government or public action in response to contamination, the decisions about rebuilding are being based upon more clearly defined risks, such as the potential for reflooding. These decisions are largely being made by individuals and third parties such as insurers, banks, mortgage companies, and, eventually, courts in condemnation proceedings, while governmental entities are trying to build a public consensus around governmental proposals.
Because some areas exhibit contaminants that are present in concentrations that exceed adopted screening standards, Louisiana RECAP standards call for further assessment and evaluation. Normally (i.e., absence a massive catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina), the existing institutions (local government, insurers, banks, etc.)
could adequately handle the volume of site-specific assessments. However, the shear volume of assessments in the case of Hurricane Katrina (and by analogy other similar large scale disasters, whether caused by nature, an industrial accident or terrorism)
suggests that there is a societal need for some degree of uniformity and equity in such decision making.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide definitive guidance as to how these assessments should be used in making decisions about the reconstruction of New Orleans, it is worthwhile to consider some guiding principles.
First, it should be recognized that the scale of decision making needed in this case (and the number of people impacted by such decisions) is of a scale not previously experienced. Thus, there are no models that can be taken off the shelf and simply used as is.
Second, there should be rules by which these decisions are made and they should be uniform, transparent, and consistent with existing hazardous waste and natural disaster clearnup criteria. History suggests that if a consensus is reached (at least among governmental entities) implementation will be easier. While the scale is difference in this situation, the tools exist and have been used in the past to make habitability decisions (e.g., Love Canal, Times Beach, World Trade Center, and prior Hurricane recovery efforts).
Third, any approach must balance the cost of an approach that maximizes equity by making a truly case-by-case determination and the need to make a large number of decisions in a relatively short period of time. There are many questions that will need to be answered. In the absence of rapid decisions and answers to the many questions, individuals will define the future of New Orleans based upon their own circumstances and desires and uniformity and equity are likely to suffer. Some might prefer that individuals or local governments to be able to call upon reconstruction funds to conduct a property owner-by-property owner assessment and to use the conclusions in decisions about the need for remedial efforts or in reconstruction planning. Others may argue that representative sampling should be used by government to make community decisions and individual property owners might seek independent sampling only to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the community decision as applied to that property.
Finally, a system for performing checks and balances on such decisions should be created because the re-development process may result in the government taking an individual's property. 22 To the extent feasible, such a system should rely upon existing methodologies, such as scientific peer review, public involvement processes, cooperative efforts between local, state, and federal agencies and/or public-private partnership. The 22 The U.S. Constitution Takings Clause states: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Thus, there may be legal proceedings at some point that takes the property of New Orlean's residents in exchange for "just compensation." Many of the issues in such a proceeding may be technical and they are likely to be effected by the policies adopted by the government and private sector concerning the risk associated with each property. 
